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Abstract 
In China’s energy cost calculation, environment compensation and energy utilization rate are neglected, which causes problems 
of high energy consumption, high pollution and low efficiency. By establishing multi-oligarchs Cournot model for energy 
enterprises, the paper figure out reaction function and equilibrium price when Nash is in equilibrium. On this basis, taxation 
factor and energy consumption incentive factor are introduced, and the changes in price, output, and profit are re-analyzed when 
Nash is in equilibrium. Finally, the paper comes out that a moderate taxation can compensate environment negative externality 
and raise energy price to its real price. In the meantime, by increasing incentive strategy, enterprise can reduce energy 
consumption and advance the development of energy sustainable utilization technology. 
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1. Introduction 
With the rapid development of China’s economy, energy demand increases sharply. In China’s energy structure, 
coal is the main resource, so it is exploited in large quantities in order to satisfy the demand. During the process of 
coal exploitation and utilization, problems of environment destruction, low-efficiency exploitation, and non-ordinal 
utilization severely influence the ecological environment balance, speed up resource exhaustibility and block 
China’s sustainable development. On the other side, China’s energy price is made mainly according to market’s 
supply-demand and production cost, but neglects the compensation for environment pollution and its negative 
externality during production process, which bring about a long-term low energy price and can not represent its real 
value.  
Effective policy supports by government will impel enterprises to follow the way of clean Production. As 
environment pollution is a classic externality problem, taxation is not only an effective tool to solve external 
problems, but also a policy by government. During the process of energy exploitation and utilization, the pollutions 
of solid dusts, SO2，CO2 etc. will be emitted. In order to take the social cost of energy production enterprises and 
energy consumers into consideration and integrate it into private cost, government must take necessary taxation 
policy and supervise over it. 
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Both production and consumption processes will have negative externality to environment. But, environment 
external cost during the two processes is not taken into consideration in China. No matter for resource price or 
consumable price, only the market mechanism cost is considered, without consideration on the compensation for 
environment pollution, so the environment problems have to be solved by government. Compared with externality 
in production, the externality in consumption characterizes for its decentralization and the effective method to solve 
its negative externality is to raise production or labor’s price to restrict consumption. So, it is necessary to introduce 
taxation mechanism in energy production area, which can compensate negative externality caused by energy 
consumption.  
As the origin of energy consumption comes out of primary energy, the energy tax can adjust energy consumption 
and the policy’s key point should be concentrated on primary energy. During primary energy production, energy tax 
for environment compensation can raise energy price and its utilization cost. Price’s conduction effect can restrain 
the energy utilization quantity of high energy consumption in enterprises and families, with which it can effectively 
utilize and save energy, and protect environment. By the research on the harms of low-price of China’s coal 
resource, WU Yuanyuan proposes two factors determine social necessary labor time, which are the necessary labor 
consumption in resource production investment and the effect to ecological resource. Gao Ying and LI Shantong 
also discuss the taxation on coal, oil and natural gas exploitation can better realize environment protection.  
The main contribution of the paper is establishing an energy taxation model by multi-oligarchs Cournot Model 
(namely Multi-Cournot Model). Energy taxation factor and energy consumption incentive factor are introduced into 
the accounting of energy production cost, and in the meantime of appropriately compensating the effect by 
environment negative externality in the process of primary energy exploitation, energy consumption enterprises are 
urged to adopt low entropy production mode, instead of high mode, and further regulate energy price to its real 
value. By this way, it can restrain excessiveness, encourage clean production, and advance economy sustainable 
development. 
In part two, normal multi-Cournot model is applied to establish model for China’s energy industry. Then, in the 
part 2.2, energy taxation and energy consumption incentive are introduced to establish extensive multi-Cournot 
model separately. In section three, different models are analyzed and compared, illustrating the effects to China’s 
energy consumption by energy taxation and energy consumption incentive. Part four is the conclusion. 
2. Multi-Cournot model of Energy taxation policy 
2.1. Multi-Cournot competitive model 
Traditional Cournot model is mainly used for bi-Cournot game analyses. Its extensive model - Multi-Cournot 
competitive model develops it into Multi-Cournot model, and it will be more appropriate to analyze some industry 
competition, which has the characteristics of monopoly. China’s energy production enterprises fit this situation. In 
order to simplify the analysis, following suppositions are made for the model: 
Assumption 1: energy enterprises are rational and have complete information; 
Assumption 2: energy enterprises act at the same time, and they don’t know others output quantity policy; 
Assumption 3: energy enterprises provide products with the same kind & quality, supposing standard coal as the 
unit; 
Assumption 4: market clearing, supply and demand decide price. 
The above mentioned suppositions can establish Multi-Cournot model for China’s energy production enterprises: 
Definition 1 Normal-Multi-Cournot Model: The players of game is oligarchies noted as Ei, i=1,…n, n≥2; let qi 
represent the output of a Oligarch i where qi∈ [0,∞]; Ci(qi) represents the cost function of Oligarch i, and 
Ci(qi)=ki+ciqi; P is price, Demand Function is P=a－bQ, where 
1
n
i
i
Q q
=
= ∑ . The payoff is equal to profit function. 
Then, the payoff of oligarch i is defined as follows: 
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According to Sherali [6] the existence and uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium Solution in Multi-Cournot Model 
have been proved. If let the First-order Derivative of each oligarch i equal to zero, reaction function of each 
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oligarch in Nash Equilibrium is computed by the following formula:  
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Then the reactions function of oligarch i can be depicted as formula (2). 
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When the equilibrium state reached we can get the price for maintaining optimal production P1： 
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The interest in equilibrium states is  
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But, the model does not consider about tax in cost definition. So, in the following part, tax factor is added and the 
structure is re-designed in order to compare the effects to above index by tax. 
2.2. Cournot extensive model of energy taxation 
At present, the exploitation work of China’s primary energy is carried out by the state. Enterprises are responsible 
for production and calculate price according to supply-demand situation and production cost, but they don’t consider 
about environment compensation and energy utilization rate. So, in the following part, tax factor and energy 
consumption incentive factor are introduced into cost accounting of multi-cournot and the Cournot extensive model 
of energy taxation is established. In this model, tax factor is used to compensate the factors of safe production, 
environment pollution etc. which are ignored in cost accounting; the size of energy consumption incentive factor is 
determined by enterprise’s energy consumption standard, in order to encourage production with low energy 
consumption and restrict high energy consumption. 
Definition 2 Tax-Multi-Cournot Model: The players of game is oligarchies noted as Ei, i=1,…, n, n≥2; let qi 
represent the output of a Oligarch i where qi∈ [0,∞];Ci(qi) represents the cost function of Oligarch i, and 
Ci(qi)=ki+ciqi+lqi, where positive number l represents rate of energy taxation; Demand Function is P=a-bQ, where 
1
n
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Q q
=
= ∑ ; The payoff is equal to profit function. Then we solve the equation and get the formula (5), (6), (7): 
Reactions function:     
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Price for maintaining optimal production: 
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The interest in equilibrium states:  
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Definition 3  T&E-Multi-Cournot Model：The players of game is oligarchies noted as Ei, i=1,…,n, n≥2; let q 
represent the output of a Oligarch i where qi∈ [0,∞]; Ci(qi) represents the cost function of Oligarch i, and 
Ci(qi)=ki+ciqi+lqi+λiqi, where constant λi is determined by Energy consumption standards for products; Demand 
Function is P=P(Q), where 
1
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= ∑ , P=a－bQ. The payoff is equal to profit function. Then we can obtain: 
Reactions function: 
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Price for maintaining optimal production: 
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The interest in equilibrium states: 
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3. Model analyses 
Comparing model 3.1 and 3.3, as the figure 1, we can find that, after adding energy tax, energy cost increases, as 
well as the price, namely P1<P2. In the condition of equilibrium, when producer achieves max profit, the condition is 
qi1>qi3, namely the enterprise obtains max profit and reduces energy consumption. Under this situation, government 
can use taxation to appropriately compensate the environment destroy and the social welfare decline caused by 
pollution during the process of energy utilization. Besides, with the energy taxation, producer will cut down energy 
output voluntarily. At a certain extent, it can avoid excessive exploitation and lower down the speed of energy 
exhaustion. 
After introducing T&E model of energy consumption incentive factor, the cost of extensive energy enterprise 
will increase, and the supply curve of max profit is the upper stipple line in Tax model (fig. 1). The supply curve for 
the enterprise that reduces energy consumption is the lower stipple line in Tax model (fig. 1). This comparison 
shows the latter is much more competitive, if in the same market.  
When energy taxation factor and energy consumption incentive factor are introduce into normal model, energy 
taxation factor raises production cost, so enterprises have to increase production price. The result is that average 
return from factors is reduced and consumers’ welfare benefit is also damaged. But, under the situation of 
equilibrium, excessive exploitation won’t bring more profit. If enterprise wants more, the only way is to improve 
technology to reduce energy consumption. The way can both increase profit and obtain taxation return. So it is a 
way to reduce production cost and compensate consumer’s welfare. On the other hand, China has a great need 
towards energy, so there are still some small coal mine companies. But the problems of these companies are poor 
safety situation, laggard producing technology and severe damage to environment. When energy consumption 
incentive factor is introduced, the max profit for producer with Nash Equilibrium is 3iπ  (please see formula 7). 
Under present price, the optimizing exploitation quantity is fixed. If profit needs to be increased, the only way is 
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raise index of energy consumption and cut down cost. It can urge enterprise to raise coal recovery ratio and improve 
technology. By doing this, it is better for environment protection and resource saving, but it will be a lash for small 
or technology laggard enterprises. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Supply and demand curves of Normal Model and Tax-Multi-Cournot Model 
When we decide tax rate, we use 
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When tax dodging and evasion are excluded, small coal mine companies will be expelled theoretically. And it is 
better for extensive energy industry to be changed into technology-centered one. 
4. Conclusion 
By the energy taxation on primary energy, the paper proposes ways to treat environment pollution. In the 
meantime, the paper considers about the energy consumption incentive factor, which urges enterprises to save 
energy and solves the problems of excessive resource exploitation and over-rapid consumption of strategic energy. 
The paper adjusts the total outputs of energy and resources, which makes it satisfy the need of social and economic 
development. The paper also analyzes the effects of energy taxation, which includes the increase of energy price in 
short term effects the economic development and GDP increasing, and the long term energy consumption incentive 
policy cuts down the costs of high energy consumption products, improves production technology and environment, 
and push economy towards sustainable development. The paper does not clarify the detailed numeric analyses, but, 
in the future, Numerical quantification will be designed and applied for accurate analyses on tax rate. 
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